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Taking Stock of Safety
G L McDonald1
ABSTRACT
My early experience with the coal industry was in the latter half of the
1970s, where attention to only ones own ‘accidents’ and concentration on
behaviour controls were impeding the introduction of effective
engineering controls such as ROPS, FOPS, roof support and residual
current devices. Lack of the broad picture of personal damage and of
relevant veridical (true saying) knowledge and data had to be overcome to
achieve progress in reducing fatalities. Thirty years on, it is again
necessary to take stock. How good is our knowledge, our data, our
information on which we make decisions. Despite Australian all industry
1992-93 data showing 80.5 per cent of costs came from occurrences
which permanently altered people’s lives, New South Wales is still the
only state reporting permanent disabilities. In 1991 - 1992, the rate of
permanent disability per 1000 wage and salary earners was two. In
2000 - 2001, it was over four – more than doubled. Also strongly
motivating is the huge cost. Industry carried 25 per cent of the $34.3
billion costs for 2000 - 2001, up ten per cent of 82.8 billion if the costs of
pain, suffering and early death are included.
INTRODUCTION
Community, industry, corporate and individual memory dim with
time so that valuable knowledge and experience disappear and
becomes unavailable. Stories help consolidate memory and make
available lessons from the past. This in many ways is my story as
a safety consultant for 30 years. In part it is the story of aspects
of corporations; it began and was shaped in the coal industry,
spread through other industries to finally contemplate the whole
of Australian industry.
The quest, first dimly felt and later crystallised was the
minimisation of the permanent alteration of people’s lives which
accounts for 82 per cent of the total cost of personal damage
from work. If pain, suffering and early death were costed in it
would go over 90 per cent of total costs.
ROLLOVER PROTECTIVE STRUCTURES
Fresh from research on tractor ‘accidents’, study of mechanical
engineering and psychology, and with a background of tractor
driving, I was called by UTAH to Goonyella to investigate the
overturning death of their most skilled front end loader operator
while loading coal into a haul unit in the mid 1970s. By then
rollover protective structures (ROPS) had over 15 years of
established effectiveness of saving tractor drivers’ lives, since
1958 in Sweden. Mining folklore was strong. ‘Drop the bucket’
was the conventional wisdom to stop a front end loader
overturning while ‘when in doubt, right hand out’ (drops the
bowl) was the saying which guided scraper drivers for
emergencies. These strongly held beliefs left the operators
confident and secure while they continued to be exposed to
death.
UTAH responded rapidly to recommendations to fit all earth
moving equipment with rollover protective structures (ROPS).
Other coal mining companies did not. They had not had rollover
fatalities. Two more operators were to die before the Mines
Department asked me to give evidence to have wheel dozers
replaced by track dozers on low profile stockpiles. The latter
operator had reversed over a freshly undercut stockpile edge at
night under poor light conditions. As long as it had a ROPS I did
not care whether they had tracks or wheels. The Mining
Warden’s finding resulted in compulsory ROPS for surface
mines. Underground and metalliferous mines, quarries, road
construction and dam construction were still many years away
from ROPS. A much more recent mining death in Western
Australia arose from using a posthole digging tractor old enough
to escape a legislated ROPS. Throughout Australia there are still
many tractors and tractor derivatives operating without ROPS.
A belief in ‘human error’ causation and a belief that only the
organisation’s experience was relevant delayed progress.
CLUTHA EXPERIENCE
In the late 1970s Clutha operated a number of underground coal
mines in New South Wales. They had developed a safety
program and needed a ‘motivator’ to get it to work. They had a
lost time injury frequency rate (LTIFR) well up in the hundreds
and over the past ten to 15 years had had nearly 30 fatalities, half
from roof falls and half with machinery. Their safety target for
the next year was a LTIFR of zero. This target was unrealistic
and strongly indicated a lack of understanding. A great deal of
underground work was under unsupported roof. They relied on
ringing the roof (striking the sandstone roof with a metal rod).
When asked by moving my hands apart vertically what thickness
of sandstone was required to give a clear metallic ring rather than
a thud, the group stopped the hands at about ten inches
(250 mm). When given the proposition that a clear ring meant
that either there was a good roof or that when a fall came it
would be a big one, the group replied ‘it’s always the good roof
that kills you’. More folklore.
THE FOLKLORE HURDLE
Experience showed that destroying a person’s belief in the
folklore without supplying a positive alternative provoked
considerable anger. Convincing an operator that ‘dropping the
bucket’ was not a reliable method of stopping overturning and
then requiring the person to operate the machine without a ROPS
was unacceptable. Anxiety is a difficult emotion to deal with and
high anxiety levels can severely adversely affect a person’s
performance. It was found that a person generally would not
relinquish their belief in their particular folklore until the need
for it to convince them they were not vulnerable no longer
existed. For many years nurses were strongly trained in ‘correct’
methods of lifting. This training made them psychologically
comfortable while they overloaded and permanently damaged
their bodies, mainly the spine in the lower back. A ban on the
manual lifting of patients has dramatically reduced such damage.
The belief in the folklore of ‘correct’ lifting had guaranteed that
nurses continued to expose themselves to the probability of
severe damage.
There is an element of truth in folklore, but it is a limited truth.
Each work group would laugh heartily at other industry folklore
but became disturbed and uncomfortable when their own beliefs
were challenged. When one group was asked to identify their
folklore, a supervisor summed it up well when he said:
whatever our folklore is we believe they are truths.
Someone from outside, who does not need to
believe them, has to recognise our folklore for us.
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COOPERATIVE APPROACH
The coal industry has moved a long way from those relatively
recent times. It is not always known or remembered what has
been effective. In 1978 UTAH’s Blackwater Mine imported the
first of Euclid’s short wheel base 120 tonne prime mover to haul
coal. The machine was stood down and operators refused to drive
it. The importers asked for an evaluation of the ride to determine
whether there was a problem with the prime mover or whether
they were caught in a union-management disagreement. Both a
ride in the unit and measurement of its ride vibration confirmed
it as too rough to be driven. When the manufacturer was unable
to modify the ride, the union and management agreed that the
unit should not be put into service. This cooperation meant an
unknown number of Australian miners have been saved from
permanent alteration of their lives.
In early 1996 contact from the United States of America
revealed that a number of these units had been sold into ‘green
field’ sites where the operators (sons of local farmers) had no
haul driving experience for comparison. A large number of
operators suffered vertebral end-plate fracture in the thoracic
spine and in some, damage continued into the lumbar spine. The
unit ‘loped’ or ‘pitched’ with the vibration varying from 40° to
50° to the horizontal. The horizontal accelerations equalled the
vertical. To stabilise the spine the back muscles operating at a
very shallow angle to the spine had to use maximum or near
maximum contraction to prevent the upper body rotating forward
over the pelvis. This strong contraction placed excessive
compression loads in the spine which led to the damage.
SLOW ADOPTION OF EFFECTIVE ENGINEERING
INNOVATION
During this era a sad chapter in Australian safety history was
being played out. Australia was largely oblivious. In 1969, this
author had an earth leakage circuit breaker (ELCB) fitted to all
circuits of his house being built. In the same year a Japanese
labour safety and health regulation required the fitment of
‘differential current operated protective devices’ in the
manufacturing industries. In that year (1969) there were 39 deaths,
by 1972 there were 18, in 1980 there was one (Whiteman, 1987).
During this time Australian authorities, including Standards
Australia, were working strongly on ‘rules’ which everyone
concerned had to follow. Consulting to a Regional Electricity
Board in the early 1980s led to the insight that authorities were
worried that fitment of ELCBs would encourage people to be
less careful, ie not follow the rules as well. It was many more
years before there was strong encouragement to fit ELCBs. Rules
had more influence on what was done than did the knowledge of
the devices effectiveness in Japan.
EXAMINING THE EVIDENCE
Taxonomic classification of past damaging occurrences
according to types of energy used was developed in the coal
industry and its application in the petrochemical industry
produced new understanding. Records of 1037 cases of personal
damage in one organisation showed when by reporting to an
American standard, 9919 days had been lost over several years.
At least 803 cases had no lost time, fewer than 232 cases
accounted for 919 days and two cases resulted in 9000 days. The
American standard charged 6000 days for a fatality and 3000
days for a paraplegic. If these two cases were removed, none of
the remaining 1035 cases predicted the likelihood of the
permanently life altering occurrences.
The next two organisations consulted were in the steel industry
and produced similar results. The taxonomy of ‘in house’
experience of these three work sites predicted well for ten per
cent of the damage but did not predict 90 per cent of the damage
which came from very few occurrences.
Examination of reports from New South Wales WorkCover,
the Queensland Workers Compensation Board and the American
Coal Industry confirmed that the greatest quantity of damage
came from a small number of occurrences.
Information on how lives were permanently altered was in
very short supply. There was some information available on
fatality but negligible information was available on how people
became permanently disabled. Providing expert evidence to
courts on litigation cases is a key avenue for learning in sufficient
detail how people were damaged. Around 6500 cases are now on
file at Geoff McDonald and Associates. An alternative approach
was used by Ham (2003) who examined 267 cases of death and
total permanent disability extracted from early claims on the
Queensland Coal and Oil Shale Superannuation Fund (QCOS).
The Industry Commission (1995), part of the Commonwealth
Department of Treasury reported on Work Health and Safety.
While reporting on the costs associated with injury, they also
concluded that their figures grossly underestimated the cost of
occupational disease, which was significantly under-reported.
The Report gave a costing of personal damage for 1992 - 1993.
McDonald (1995) used these costings as a basis for estimating
the proportion of cost for three classes of damage. Class I
damage occurs if the person’s life is permanently altered, Class II
if it is temporarily altered and Class III if it is inconvenienced.
• 87 per cent of occurrences were Class II and gave 18 per cent
of costs; and
• 13 per cent of occurrences were Class I and gave 82 per cent
of costs.
This confirmed the view already formed that health and safety
at work is fundamentally a Class I problem. Class I fatal
accounted for 1.5 per cent of total cost. Class I non-fatal
accounted for 80.5 per cent of total cost. Pain, suffering and early
death were not costed in this exercise.
Effort over the years to focus attention on Class I non-fatal
occurrences has been singularly unsuccessful. Despite the
Industry Commission’s 1995 report, New South Wales is still the
only state reporting permanent disabilities. All other states are
unaccountable for 80 per cent of the total cost of damage to
members of the community on whose behalf they are required to
manage work health and safety.
The National Occupational Health and Safety Commission
(2002) (NOHSC) set ten year targets as follows:
sustain a significant, continual reduction in the
incidence of work-related fatalities with a
reduction of at least 20 per cent by 30 June 2012.
(and with a reduction of ten per cent being
achieved by 30 June 2007), and … reduce the
incidence of workplace injury by at least
40 per cent by 30 June 2012 (with a reduction of
20 per cent being achieved by 30 June 2007).
No mention is made of reducing cases which permanently alter
people’s lives non-fatally, ie those cases which account for
80.5 per cent of the cost in 1992 - 1993.
To examine change over recent years, it is necessary to look to
New South Wales WorkCover since they are the only source
which includes information on permanent disability. New South
Wales WorkCover figures have been plotted and lines of
regression calculated for the years 1991 - 1992 to 2000 - 2001.
From the line of regression ‘all occurrences’ have declined from
28 per 1000 wage and salary earners in 1991 - 1992 to 22 in
2000 - 2001, a ten year change rate (decrease) of 22.7 per cent as
shown in Figure 1.
By contrast, as shown in Figure 2, ‘permanent injury’ has
increased from two per 1000 wage and salary earners in
1991 - 1992 to around 4.4 in 2000 - 2001. The rate of change is
equivalent to an increase of 140 per cent over a ten year period.
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On the basis of these figures, the national targets set by NOHSC
could be met, indicating desirable progress had been made when
the quantity of damage had actually increased.
Further confirmation of the increasing quantity of damage in the
Class I region comes from the National Occupational Health and
Safety Commission’s (2004) updating of costs of work related
injury and illness to the year 2000 - 2001. Whereas 82 per cent of
costs in 1992 - 1993 came from 13 per cent of occurrences, 92 per
cent of costs came from 15 per cent of occurrences in 2000 - 2001.
Again these costs do not include a consideration for pain, suffering
and early death and totalled $34.3 billion. A further costing for
pain, suffering and early death was made and brought the total
cost from work damage to people to $82.8 billion. When the cost
of pain, suffering and early death is included, 15 per cent of
occurrences account for 96.5 per cent of costs.
This is powerful and surely irrefutable evidence that effort must
be directed to the top end of the severity scale – Class I damage.
McDonald E L (1997) produced a taxonomy, ‘Accidents in the
Coal Mining Industry 1990 - 1995’ for the New South Wales
Minerals Council and the Queensland Mining Council. This
sought to describe the origins of Class I damage but functionally
had to settle for dealing with cases where greater than 90 days
work was lost and fatalities. Eight hundred and ninety two
underground mining and 312 open cut mining cases were
classified according to the type of energy. For all coal mining
human (39.8), gravitational (32.3) and machine (20.6) accounted
for 92.7 per cent of occurrences, while human (38), gravitational
(34.7) and machine (22.09) accounted for 94.8 per cent of costs.
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ALL OCCURRENCES
(NSW WorkCover)
EMPLOYMENT DAMAGE – ALL OCCURRENCES
By Severity of Outcome
1991-92 to 2000-01













CD : Coefficient of Determination
CR : Change Rate per 10 Years
Incidence : Rate per 1 000 wage and salary earners
FIG 1 - Employment damage – all occurrences.
PERMANENT
(NSW WorkCover)
EMPLOYMENT DAMAGE – PERMANENT
1991-92 to 2000-01











CD : Coefficient of Determination
CR : Change Rate per 10 Years
Incidence : Rate per 1 000 wage and salary earners
FIG 2 - Employment damage – permanent.
Careful study of the taxonomy gives interesting insight. In
considering open cut mining, combining a number of different
taxa gives a picture of ‘ride disturbance’ which accounted for 27
per cent of occurrences and 49 per cent of cost. Figure 3 shows
74 cases occurred while the vehicle was moving and most
involved vibration and jarring, with four coming from the
operator impacting the vehicle interior. The ‘stationary’ cases
mostly involved loading. This taxonomy provides a platform for
a more detailed assessment which would identify such problems
as mismatching of the ride characteristics of a machine and of
the vibration isolation characteristics of the installed seat, as well
as operational problems.
Over recent years attention has been directed to the Australia
wide problem. Each day in 1992 - 1993, 137 people working in
Australia had their life permanently altered by damage from
work – 50 000 people a year. Of these approximately 20 000 will
never work again and 30 000 work for fewer hours or on less
skilled work. By now many more people per day will have their
lives permanently altered. A nation cannot afford this loss.
If the late 1970s early 1980s experience with the coal and
other industries is interrogated, it shows specific issues related to
death were identified, specific solutions were developed and
adopted. This occurred within a framework of the development
of a new understanding and resulted in the gradual rejection of
only partially true folklore. Its anxiety managing influence
became unnecessary. WorkCover (1998 - 1999 – 2000 - 2001)
shows that the three largest defined groups ‘manual handling’ 35
per cent, ‘Falls to the same level’ 23 per cent and ‘falls from
height’ 11 per cent account for almost 60 per cent of cases. This
appears different from human (39.8), gravitational (32.3) and
machine (20.6) for McDonald’s coal taxonomy until it is realised
that the vast majority of WorkCover 15 per cent ‘other’ involves
motor vehicles. On this basis the WorkCover data can be
referenced human (35), gravitational (24) and machine (15).
Other cases would fit into these three groups so that the overall
energy sources would be similar to that of the coal taxonomy. In
many cases, however, the details of what happened in each case
will be vastly different. It is knowledge of this specific detail
which is critical, not only of individual cases but also of
aggregated similar cases, to show clearly ‘common pattern’ and
‘individual differences’ so that specific countermeasures can be
developed on the basis of veridical (true saying) knowledge.
THE SAFETY PARADOX
The safety paradox must be confronted. On the one hand there
are far too many Class I occurrences, on the other hand each
specific type of Class I damaging occurrence is so rare that an
individual who has to make safety judgements has no experience
(first, second or third hand) or knowledge of them. They may
well know the applicable folklore. Millions of person years of
experience have to be aggregated to compile the appropriate
detailed knowledge. The coal taxonomy was a start to
aggregating and presenting information. It needs to develop
further and grow on a continuous basis.
Our governments have the responsibility of managing work
health and safety on behalf of the community they represent.
They have adopted Robens style legislation which strongly
requires management-workforce consultation and appears to
assume the workforce knows what is required. In many cases
they do not. The knowledge of what is required is embedded in
the 137 a day (50 000 a year) cases of permanent life alteration.
Sufficiently detailed case histories of these cases have to be
aggregated, taxonomised, dissected and digested so that
appropriate knowledge can be educated back to the workplace.
While it is not clear who could most effectively do this, it is clear
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FIG 3 - Taxonomy of ride disturbance.
that it is the government’s responsibility to see that it is done so
that safety is not directed by lack of knowledge and by risk
assessment necessarily based on the ‘feeling function’, as
information is not available to enable the ‘thinking function’ to
be used.
Within governments the safety function is under funded, with
funds coming from industry and not from community generated
money. According to NOHSC (2004), if pain, suffering and early
death are not included in costing, the employer carries 25 per
cent of the cost. Therefore the individual and the community
carry 75 per cent of the cost. If pain, suffering and early death are
included the employer carries 12 per cent and the individual and
the community carry 88 per cent of the cost. The community has
far more to gain by a reduction in Class I damage than does the
employer. The employer has much to gain as better quality
information gives more efficient and effective control effort.
Earlier it was stated that the total cost of work personal damage
for 2000 - 2001 was $34.2 billion without pain, suffering and early
death being costed and $88.2 billion if it was. By way of
illustrating the size of that amount it is noted that BHP Billiton
was quoted during the proposed WMC take over as having a value
of $89 billion. The cost of Australia’s work damage to people for
one year is of the same order of magnitude.
CONCLUSION
The argument for focusing on Class I damaging occurrences (the
13 per cent) is very powerful as long as we know what they are.
In mining you do not dig out all the material so that in the
process you get the product (coal, iron ore, etc) you want. Rather,
you map the formation, and in the case of coal, identify the
seams and target them. Safety should work the same way.
The moment permanent alteration of life or permanent
disability is mentioned the possibility (or in some people’s
minds, the certainty) of malingering and fraud is raised. Nothing
deactivates safety more. The prominence of, and our need to
focus on Class I is robust.
The robustness is illustrated by testing the assumption that half
of the Class I occurrences are not genuine. This gives 7.5 units of
Class I damage and 85 units of Class II damage for a total
of 92.5 units. Class I occurrences then make up eight per cent of
occurrences. For costs with pain, suffering and early death
included, the 96.5 halves to 48.25 units for Class I cost plus 3.5
units of cost for Class II, giving 51.75 units of total cost. Class I
cost now is 93 per cent of total cost. Said simply, halving the
number of Class I occurrences reduces Class I cost from 96.5 to
93 per cent of the total cost. Figure 4 graphically illustrates the
above figures and shows that Class I occurrences will dominate
the overall cost until very large Class I reductions have been
made.
The development of a sufficiently detailed, comprehensive and
organised information base to guide on site safety activities is
necessary. This needs to include Class I injuries with detailed
reporting of circumstances, damage and proposed preventative
measures. The reporting of incidents which have potential to
cause Class I injuries should be reported in the same detail. The
data collection system also needs to look harder to capture data
on the cases of Class I occupational disease and traumatic
injuries that may have been contributed to by occupational
exposures and disorders.
The state governments require that a vast number of
Australians to identify hazards, do risk assessments and take
effective control action – and get it right. If they do not they will
be punished. This is equivalent to a teacher setting a class a
subject, providing very limited resource material and examining
with relatively obscure penetrating questions, with dire
consequences for poor performance.
What do we need to do to develop a focusing database so that
the upward Australian trend in permanent disability can be
turned downwards?
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FIG 4 - Effect of halving Class I cost on proportion of cost.
